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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
 
DISTRICT OF OREGON 
 
 
 
CECILIA L. BARNES, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
YAHOO!, INC., a Delaware 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
 
CV. 05-926-AA
 
PLAINTIFF’S RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AMENDED COMPLAINT
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
 
A. The Complaint Constitutes a Sufficient Pleading of Promissory Estoppel as a Matter 
of the Law of the Case.   
Plaintiff filed her initial complaint in state court and drafted the liability paragraphs 
(9 to 11) in terms of negligent, unreasonable conduct in the performance of a duty voluntarily 
assumed.  The Ninth Circuit opinion found that the facts, as had been alleged in paragraphs 1-8 
of her complaint also gave rise to a claim of promissory estoppel. 
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The opinion held that section 230(c) of the Communications Decency Act prohibits 
claims of negligence against Internet providers, who are not otherwise responsible for third-party 
content.  It does not, however, bar claims of promissory estoppel. 
Promising is different because it is not synonymous with the 
performance of the action promised.  That is, whereas one cannot 
undertake to do something without simultaneously doing it, one 
can, and often does, promise to do something without actually 
doing it at the same time.  Contract liability here would come not 
from Yahoo’s publishing conduct, but from Yahoo’s manifest 
intention to be legally obligated to do something, which happens to 
be removal of material from publication.  Contract law treats the 
outwardly manifested intention to create an expectation on the part 
of another as a legally significant event.  That event generates a 
legal duty distinct from the conduct at hand, be it the conduct of a 
publisher, of a doctor, or of an overzealous uncle. 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1107 (9th Cir. 2009). 
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that a mere monitoring policy, or even an undertaking 
by Yahoo! to try to help an aggrieved party, would not suffice, by itself, to give rise to contract 
liability.  The opinion acknowledged that the alleged promise need “. . . be worded consistently 
with its being intended to be enforceable.”  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1108, citing Workman v. United 
Parcel Service Inc., 234 F.3d 998, 1001 (7th Cir. 2000).  The Ninth Circuit found, however, that 
the promise alleged by Plaintiff’s complaint adequately stated an enforceable promise. 
As we indicated above, Barnes’ complaint could also be read to 
base liability on section 90 of the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, which describes a theory of recovery often known as 
promissory estoppel.  At oral argument, counsel for Barnes 
acknowledged that its tort claim might be “recast” in terms of 
promissory estoppel.  We think it might, and in analyzing it as such 
now we add that liability for breach of promise is different from, 
and not merely a rephrasing of, liability for negligent undertaking. 
Barnes. 570 F.3d at 1106. 
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Yahoo! argues that the concluding paragraph of the opinion left the matter open for 
further pleading arguments: 
Therefore, we conclude that, insofar as Barnes alleges a breach of 
contract claim under the theory of promissory estoppel, subsection 
230(c)(1) of the Act does not preclude her cause of action.  
Because we have only reviewed the affirmative defense that Yahoo 
raised in this appeal, we do not reach the question whether Barnes 
has a viable contract claim or whether Yahoo has an affirmative 
defense under subsection 230(c)(2) of the Act. 
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1109. 
Yahoo!’s argument stretches too far.  The Court’s preceding analysis of the law of a 
promissory estoppel claim identifies open issues which remain to be decided at trial, or at best 
by summary judgment after the close of discovery.  They are: 
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2. 
3. 
Was the promise “as clear and well defined as a promise that could serve as an 
offer . . .”?  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1106. 
Did Yahoo! intend “actually or constructively, to induce reliance on the part of 
the promisee”?  Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1107. 
Was reliance reasonably foreseeable? 
The objective intention to be bound by a promise—which, again, 
promissory estoppel derives from a promise that induces reason-
ably foreseeable, detrimental reliance—also signifies the waiver of 
certain defenses.  A putative promisor might defend on grounds 
that show that the contract was never formed (the lack of accept-
ance or a meeting of the minds, for example) or that he could not 
have intended as the evidence at first suggests he did (unconscion-
ability, duress, or incapacity, for example).  Such defenses go to 
the integrity of the promise and the intention it signifies; they 
usually cannot be waived by the agreement they purport to 
undermine.  But once a court concludes a promise is legally 
enforceable according to contract law, it has implicitly concluded 
that the promisor has manifestly intended that the court enforce his 
promise.   
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1108. 
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The context shows, therefore, that the Ninth Circuit concluded its opinion with the 
unremarkable comment that it was not deciding the merits of the case.  There may yet be 
evidence denying that Ms. Osako ever spoke to Ms. Barnes.  There may be evidence contra-
dicting Ms. Barnes’s memory of the nature of promise.  Ms. Osako may testify that she never 
said anything like what Ms. Barnes says she said.  If those sorts of contradictions develop, they 
must, of course, be determined by the jury.  Accepting as true what the complaint says about the 
promise, however, the Ninth Circuit opinion found a facial claim of promissory estoppel, and it 
left no room for Yahoo! to start all over with more (allegedly dispositive) pleading motions.1  
B. The Amended Complaint Sufficiently Alleges Reliance. 
Yahoo!’s second argument not only mischaracterizes Ms. Barnes’s amended complaint, it 
is also highly insensitive, if not callous.   
Unless Plaintiff can show that such further efforts would have been 
successful in having the profiles removed—which is implausible at 
best, given her failure to identify any such efforts and the fact that 
she had already been trying unsuccessfully for months to have 
profiles removed—continuing harassment resulting from the pro-
files themselves is not sufficient to show a detrimental change in 
position.  Rather, that simply demonstrates continuation of the 
status quo before Yahoo!’s alleged promise. 
Def.’s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss Amend. Compl., p. 13. 
It is correct that at this point Ms. Barnes does not yet know which of the thousands of 
employees of Yahoo! possessed the know-how necessary to delete “her” profiles from the web-
site.  Nor does she know whether that person, or those persons, required five seconds, or five 
 
1 It may be of interest to note that the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California 
characterized the promise alleged by Ms. Barnes as one which “scarcely could have been clearer 
or more direct.”  Goddard v. Google, Inc., ___ F. Supp.2nd ___, 2009 WL 2365866 (N.D. Cal.) 
at p. 8. 
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hours, or five days, to delete them.  What she does know, and has alleged, is that after she lost 
faith in Ms. Osako’s promise, she consulted an attorney, filed this action, and the profiles 
promptly disappeared.  Amend. Compl., ¶ 10.  Ms. Osako may not have known how to delete the 
profile, or she may not have cared enough to find out, once she successfully defused the detri-
mental news story.  Yahoo!’s attorneys, however, knew exactly what to do, and it took them no 
time at all to do it, once the lawsuit was filed.  The Ninth Circuit opinion acknowledged as much. 
Approximately two months passed without word from Yahoo, at 
which point Barnes filed this lawsuit against Yahoo in Oregon 
state court.  Shortly thereafter, the profiles disappeared from 
Yahoo’s website, apparently never to return. 
Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1099. 
The amended complaint also fairly alleges another factual basis of active reliance—one 
which Ms. Barnes carried out in precisely the manner intended by Yahoo!.  Ms. Osako was the 
director of communications of Yahoo!.  Amend. Compl., ¶ 7.  She became alarmed when she 
learned that a television news reporter was about to air a very unflattering story about the danger 
posed by Yahoo!’s website to women in Ms. Barnes’s situation, and about Yahoo!’s total indif-
ference to the danger and distress.  Id.  One may fairly assume that one of the functions of a 
director of communications is to promote favorable publicity, and to prevent unfavorable 
publicity. 
In reliance upon Ms. Osako’s promise, Ms. Barnes called the reporter to say that Yahoo! 
had finally promised to delete the profiles.  Id.  It is correct that the amended complaint does not 
expressly allege that the unfavorable story was thereafter changed to a more favorable one 
because of Ms. Barnes’s call, but Plaintiff believes that is fairly implied by the complaint.  
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Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 7, 8.  It also happens to be the truth of the matter, and Plaintiff is prepared to 
allege as much expressly, if the Court finds that to be necessary. 
It follows, of course, that Yahoo!’s legal argument is misplaced.  Plaintiff recognizes that 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, requires a complaint to allege sufficient factual matter to render 
a claim facially plausible.  550 U.S. 544 (2007).   
In the Twombly case, the plaintiffs filed an antitrust, market-dividing complaint against 
the regional phone companies which provided local phone service.  They alleged the companies 
did not compete in each other’s territories, and they resisted competition in their own, neither of 
which the Supreme Court pointed out was unlawful.  What would have made it unlawful was a 
contract, combination or conspiracy—something beyond conscious parallelism. 
The problem in the Twombly case was the complaint contained no factual information—
other than parallel conduct—that any agreement ever existed. 
To begin with the complaint leaves no doubt that plaintiffs rest 
their § 1 claim on descriptions of parallel conduct and not on any 
independent allegation of actual agreement among the ILECs. 
Id., 550 U.S. 564. 
The Supreme Court held that some factual description of the existence or nature of an 
actual agreement was required at the pleading state, in order to justify the burden and expense 
inherent in antitrust discovery proceedings. 
. . . we hold that stating such a claim requires a complaint with 
enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an agreement 
was made.  Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement 
does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it 
simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that 
discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement. 
Id., 550 U.S. 556. 
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Twombly imposed no serious burden upon the typical contract complaints filed under 
FRCP 8.  There is a fair suspicion that the Twombly plaintiffs were unable to describe which 
companies made the alleged agreement, or when, or what the agreement provided for, because 
they had no knowledge whatsoever—beyond parallel conduct—that an agreement actually 
existed.  The typical contact plaintiff, by contrast, knows what the promise was, who made it, 
and who broke it.  Even after Twombly that is all that is required for a plausible complaint. 
Regardless of its failure to allege any breach of contract, however, 
Cash and Carry may yet proceed with its action under the doctrine 
of promissory estoppel.  Cash and Carry has alleged that on two 
specific occasions, U.S. Smokeless promised to accept returns of 
its products.  It further alleges that Cash and Carry took 
U.S. Smokeless at its word and reasonably relied on each of these 
promises to its detriment.  These allegations will support a claim 
for equitable relief. 
Phoenix Cash and Carry, LLC v. U.S. Smokeless Tobacco Brands, Inc., 2008 WL 4850203 
at p. 3 (U.S.D.C. Ariz. 2008) (footnote omitted). 
In order to survive a motion to dismiss, plaintiffs must allege 
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”  
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.  Here plaintiffs allege that because of 
defendants’ delay, it is now harder for them to buy life insurance 
(presumably because plaintiffs are now older).. . .  They also claim 
that they no longer have the opportunity to make incremental pay-
ments to maintain their policies and instead must make up the 
shortfall in one lump sum,. . . and that defendants have prevented 
them from cashing out the value of their policies, . . ..  The Court 
finds that these allegations are more than sufficient to establish a 
“plausible” claim that plaintiffs were damaged by defendants’ 
purportedly wrongful acts. 
* * * 
According to defendants, plaintiffs have not alleged that they 
would have done anything differently had they been given the 
correct information about the amounts they owed, and have there-
fore failed to adequately allege that they detrimentally relied on 
defendants’ failure to charge policyholders the full amounts due on 
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their accounts.  This is a reprise of defendants’ argument about 
damages.  The extent to which plaintiffs’ reliance on defen-
dants’ failure to inform them of the amounts due on their 
accounts was detrimental is an issue that the Court cannot take 
up at the pleading stage.  Plaintiffs have alleged that they were 
harmed by being denied the opportunity to buy life insurance 
elsewhere, to make incremental payments to restore their policies, 
and to cash out their policies.. . .  These factual allegations are 
sufficient support for their contention that they relied to their 
detriment on defendants’ representations. 
Vint v. Element Payment Services, Inc., 2009 WL 1749605 at p. 5 (U.S.D.C. Ariz. 2009) 
(emphasis added). 
Defendant also mischaracterizes the leading Oregon cases which describe the Oregon law 
of promissory estoppel.  The same cases were cited and relied upon in the Ninth Circuit opinion.  
In Schafer v. Fraser, the plaintiff farmer incurred expense to pay for expert fees in order to prove 
that his cattle were injured by effluent from an aluminum plant.  206 Or. 446, 290 P.2d 190, 
294 P.2d 609 (1956).  He testified that he did so, because his attorneys assured him that the 
expenses would be shared by 15 other plaintiffs whose similar cases were then pending.  Id.  It 
turned out the attorneys were not authorized to make those assurances, and the plaintiff 
recovered a judgment for his advances.  Id.  The Supreme Court held that whether the plaintiff 
had actually relied upon the assurances—as he testified—was a question for the jury.  Schafer, 
206 Or. at 481, 483. 
The Schafer opinion dealt with the probably more typical promissory estoppel situation 
wherein the plaintiff took action in reliance upon a promise which would otherwise have been 
unenforceable for lack of consideration, or lack of a necessary writing.  Schafer adopted the 
restatement formulation, however, which calls for enforcement of any promise reasonably 
expected to “induce action or forebearance.”  Id.  Schafer also approved the holding of 
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W.B. Saunders Co. v. Galbraith, which found a claim for promissory estoppel where the plaintiff 
delayed bringing a claim and a lawsuit in reliance upon an unkept promise to sell estate property 
to satisfy the debt.  Schafer, 206 Or. at 475, citing W.B. Saunders Co. v. Galbraith, 
40 Ohio App. 155, 178 N.E. 34 (1931). 
Similarly, in Potter v. Hatter Farms, Inc., the Oregon Court of Appeals affirmed a jury 
verdict in favor of a turkey hatcher who testified that he did not sell 192,000 poults to either 
California buyer who wanted them—in a scarce, time-sensitive market—because he had an oral 
commitment from the defendant, an Oklahoma buyer, to purchase them.  56 Or. App. 254, 
641 P2d. 628 (1982). 
If Yahoo! desires to defend this case by claiming that it did not have to delete the 
profiles, there was nothing Ms. Barnes could ever do to make them do it, and they never would 
have removed the profiles, despite the danger it presented to her, Yahoo! is free to present that 
defense to the Court and the jury.  The facts of the case, and the facts alleged, however, show 
that a lawsuit eventually did result in the prompt deletion of the profiles.  Amend. Compl., ¶ 10.  
The jury, therefore, may not believe Yahoo!’s defense.  It may also believe that, had Ms. Barnes 
not been lulled into waiting, a lawsuit would have helped her sooner.   
Even if the Ninth Circuit had not already decided the question, the amended complaint 
shows at least two “plausible” factual bases of reliance—one constituting action, one fore-
bearance.  Amend. Compl., ¶¶ 7-9.  First, Plaintiff cooperated to diffuse a news story which 
would have shown Yahoo! to be indifferent to the danger of sexual assault created by its 
lucrative website.  “Plaintiff Barnes, thereafter, called the reporter, and told him that Yahoo 
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promised to terminate the profiles.”  Amend. Compl., ¶ 7.  Second, Plaintiff delayed in reliance 
upon Ms. Osako’s unkept promise,  
Plaintiff Barnes expected and relied on Defendant Yahoo to pro-
vide assistance to Plaintiff Barnes by putting a stop to the unautho-
rized profiles, and therefore Plaintiff Barnes forebore further 
efforts to remove the unauthorized profiles.   
Amend. Compl., ¶ 9. 
Defendant Yahoo, in breach of the promise described above, failed 
to remove the unauthorized profiles and prohibit them from being 
posted again, until after the filing of this action. 
Amend. Compl., ¶ 10. 
This delay, due to her reliance on Yahoo!’s promise, resulted in Ms. Barnes facing addi-
tional assaults and propositions.  They were no part of the status quo ante.  They increased and 
exacerbated her danger and distress. 
C. Conclusion. 
For all of the reasons explained above, Plaintiff respectfully requests the Court to deny 
Defendant’s motion. 
DATED this 14 day of September, 2009. 
s/ Thomas R. Rask, III  
THOMAS R. RASK, III 
OSB NO. 93403 
(503) 222-3531 
Attorney for Plaintiff Cecilia L. Barnes 
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